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We present a unified formalism for threshold quantum secret sharing using graph states of systems
with prime dimension. We construct protocols for three varieties of secret sharing: with classical
and quantum secrets shared between parties over both classical and quantum channels.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Secret sharing” refers to an important family of mul-
tiparty cryptographic protocols in both the classical [1, 2]
and the quantum [3–6] contexts. A secret sharing pro-
tocol comprises a dealer and n players who are intercon-
nected by some set of classical or quantum channels. The
“secret” to be shared is a classical string or quantum state
and is distributed among the players by the dealer in such
a way that it can only be recovered by certain subsets of
players acting collaboratively. The access structure is the
set of all subsets of players who can recover the secret,
and the adversary structure corresponds to those subsets
that obtain no knowledge of the secret. There may, in
addition, be external eavesdroppers who should also gain
no knowledge of the secret. Secret sharing protocols have
practical applications in, for example, money transfer [4]
and voting [7] schemes. Recently, a unified formalism for
a range of protocols for sharing both classical and quan-
tum secrets using qubit graph states [8] has been pro-
posed [6]. The formalism allows for both classical and
quantum channels between the dealer and players and
covers three common varieties of secret sharing within a
single framework. In this paper we develop an analogous
formalism for the case of systems of prime-dimensional
quantum states.
Although qubit systems are generally the most
straightforward to describe and the theory of qubit graph
states is well-developed, there are good reasons to con-
sider higher-dimensional systems as well. If players’
shares consist of such systems, it may be more efficient
to make direct use of the larger Hilbert space than to
work with encoded qubits. Additionally, certain access
structures are known not to be possible using the existing
secret sharing schemes on qubit graph states [6, 9] or, in
some cases, using any scheme with qubit shares. An ex-
ample of the latter (which can, however, be implemented
using qutrits) was given by Cleve, Gottesman, and Lo
[4]. A more broad justification is that one often needs
to consider higher-dimensional states in order to derive
rigorous general results in quantum information theory,
such as in certain no-go theorems [10–12].
Our aim is therefore to find a unified formalism for se-
cret sharing that is not restricted to the qubit case. As
discussed recently [8, 13, 14], graph and stabilizer states
can be extended to the qudit case for prime dimensions.
Following this approach, we find direct extensions of the
existing qubit protocols [6] in d dimensions, where d is
prime i.e. we find protocols for sharing classical secrets
with d possible values and secret quantum states within a
d-dimensional Hilbert space, using graph states shared by
a dealer and players, each with a d-dimensional subsys-
tem. Our work therefore achieves, in higher-dimensional
systems, the goals previously achieved for qubits [6],
namely, providing a general graph-state unification for
sharing classical and quantum secrets using both classi-
cal and quantum channels, and in this way extends the
protocols to more general access structures. Note that
we are primarily demonstrating how a subset of existing
secret sharing protocols, already known to be achievable,
can be unified within our formalism; we are not attempt-
ing to address via the formalism any existing limitations
in quantum and classical secret sharing. Additionally,
however, we have demonstrated protocols within our for-
malism which have not been previously shown: the case
of three parties sharing classical secrets distributed over
quantum channels (secure or insecure), in which a mini-
mum of two parties are required to recover the secret.
In general, there are many different possible access
structures for secret sharing schemes. In our work we
consider the specific case of threshold secret sharing. In
such a scheme the secret can be recovered if and only
if any k of the n players collaborate to do so (and any
set of fewer than k players are denied any knowledge of
the secret). All that is required is that enough players
collaborate; i.e. it does not matter which k players do so.
Thus the access structure comprises any set of at least k
players, with the remainder forming the adversary struc-
ture. This is denoted as a (k, n) threshold secret sharing
scheme. Note that one can construct arbitrary access
structures for both classical [15] and quantum [5] secret
sharing by concatenating threshold protocols; thus it is
sufficient to consider only threshold secret sharing to ad-
dress general secret sharing.
Here we consider three specific varieties of such
schemes previously demonstrated in qubit graph states
[6]. We note that all existing forms of secret sharing that
have been proposed fall into one of these categories.
21. CC schemes: The secret is classical, the dealer is
connected to the players via private quantum chan-
nels and all players are connected by private clas-
sical channels.
2. CQ schemes: The secret is classical, the dealer
shares public quantum channels with each player
and the players are connected to each other by pri-
vate classical channels.
3. QQ schemes: The secret is quantum, the dealer
shares either private or public quantum channels
with each player and the players are connected to
each other by private quantum or classical chan-
nels.
In Sec. II, we formally define the structure and graph-
ical representation of graph states for qudits and explain
how classical information can be encoded on to such
states and later accessed. In Sec. II D we show the ef-
fect of local (d-dimensional) Pauli measurements on qu-
dit graphs and derive rules (partially shown previously
[14]) for the form of the consequent-reduced graph states,
analogous to “local complementation” in the qubit case.
In Sec. III we demonstrate specific CC, CQ and QQ pro-
tocols which may be implemented in qudit graphs given
the properties previously derived (though we note that in
the case of the (n, n) QQ scheme, the secret is not per-
fectly denied to the adversary structure). We present,
as an example of the power of higher dimensions, the
(2, 3) case, which is not possible with qubit graph state
schemes [6], as well as higher-dimensional analogues to
those presented in [6].
II. GRAPH STATES FOR QUDITS
Graph states [16] are a class of entangled multipar-
tite states (including the well-known n-qubit GHZ state)
of wide interest in quantum information. Their useful
properties include a convenient graphical representation
and characterisation within the stabilizer formalism [17],
as well as their practical application within information
processing, in particular for computation [18] and error
correction [14, 19, 20], and their amenability for the rep-
resentation of information flow [9, 21]. Such states have
been created and applied in this way for up to six qubits
[22, 23], and recent work [14] has considered the case of
higher-dimensional graph states. We employ the same
framework in sections II B and IIA as that in previous
work [8, 13, 14] although we use different notation more
suited to secret sharing.
A. Graph states
We now introduce qudit graph states and their graph-
ical representation. Consider a finite field Fd of order d,
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FIG. 1. A 5-qudit graph in d = 7 and associated adjacency
matrix A
where d is a prime number > 2, and a weighted undi-
rected graph i.e. a set of n vertices V = {vi} joined by a
set of edges E = {eij = {vi, vj}}.
Each edge eij has an assigned “weight” Aij ∈ Fd. E
only contains edges with non-zero weights: a weight of
zero corresponds to two vertices not being joined by an
edge. No vertex is joined to itself. We can summarise
this information in an n× n “adjacency matrix” A with
elements Aij . We therefore have Aij = Aji for all vi, vj ∈
V and Aii = 0 for all vi ∈ V.
We define the computational basis {|j〉 | j ∈ Fd}. Then
the graph state represented by the above graphical con-
struction is
|G〉 :=
∏
eij∈E
C
Aij
ij |0〉⊗n (1)
where we define the two-qudit controlled-Z operator
Cab|j〉a|k〉b := ωjk|j〉a|k〉b, (2)
the operator
U |i〉 :=
∑
j∈Fd
ωij |j〉, (3)
and the basis
|¯i〉 := U−1|i〉 | i ∈ Fd. (4)
An example graph and associated adjacency matrix are
depicted in Fig. 1.
B. Local operators and labelling
Here, in an analogous way to the qubit case [6], we
describe the encoding of classical information onto the
graph state by applying local operators to the individual
qudits that are graphically represented by the vertices of
the graph. Here and later we make use of the generalized
Pauli operators [24–26]
Z|j〉 := ωj |j〉, (5)
X |j〉 := |j + 1〉 (6)
3where ω = e2πi/d. These operators satisfy Xd = Zd = I.
(It follows that ZX = ωXZ and that the eigenstates
of the operators Z,X,XZ,XZ2 . . .XZd−1 form a set of
mutually unbiased bases [27]. We consider only this sub-
set of the general operators XmZn as they are sufficient
for defining the graph-state stabilizers and for our secret
sharing protocols.) We further define the operator
S|j〉 := ωj(j−1)/2|j〉. (7)
which satisfies SZ = ZS and SXS−1 = XZ.
In a labelled graph state each vertex vi is assigned a
label ℓi := (zi, xi,mi), where zi, xi,mi ∈ Fd. Denoting
an operator O acting on a vertex vi as Oi, the graph
state is labelled by applying the operators Smii X
xi
i Z
zi
i
to the state |G〉. We describe the combined labels for
all vertices by ℓ := (z,x,m), where z := (z1, z2 . . . , zn),
and similarly for x and m. We use the notation
Zz := Zz11 ⊗ Zz22 ⊗ . . .⊗ Zznn (8)
and similarly for X and S. Thus the labelled graph state
is
|Gℓ〉 := SmXxZz|G〉. (9)
Note that our definition differs from that used previously
for qubits [6] in that we apply the S operators after the
X operators rather than before.
Finally, we define an encoded graph state as a labelled
graph state with x = 0.
C. Stabilizers
Higher-dimensional graph states can be represented
within the stabilizer formalism [8, 13, 14]. The encoded
graph state with labels ℓ satisfies, for each vertex vi [14],
Ki|Gℓ〉 = ω−zi |Gℓ〉 (10)
where
Ki := (XZ
mi)iZ
Ai , (11)
and we define, for a qudit operator O and scalar multiple
k,
OkAi :=
∏
vj∈V
O
kAij
j . (12)
The {Ki} is thus a set of stabilizers for the encoded
graph state, and |Gℓ〉 is the unique state (up to a global
phase) satisfying (10) for all vertices vi. Note that the
{Ki} are tensor products of local operators; thus, even in
the absence of any quantum communication, the value of
Ki may be measured through local operations and classi-
cal communication (LOCC) by the appropriate subset of
parties combining their local measurement results. Note
also that we need only consider exponents of these local
operators modulo d.
It follows from (11) and (9) and the commutation re-
lations of Sec. II B that applying the stabilizer Ki to a
labelled graph state |Gℓ〉 is equivalent (up to a global
phase) to implementing the label change xi → xi + 1 ,
zj → zj +Aij (mod d) for all eij ∈ E; i.e.
|Gℓ〉 = SmXxZz|G〉 ∝ SmXxXiZzZAi |G〉 (13)
Thus the two different labellings correspond to the same
physical state. As in the qubit case [6], we can exploit
this property to determine the state’s dependence on par-
ticular qudit labels.
D. Local measurements
Our CQ and QQ protocols involve one of the parties as
a designated “dealer”, whose local measurement on her
own qudit produces a reduced graph state shared by the
other parties with some access structure and labelling
determined by the dealer’s measurement outcome. We
therefore consider the effect of local measurements on
qudit graph states. This has previously been determined
in the qubit case.
We will closely follow the derivation for the effect of
measurements on qubit graphs in [8], the results of which
were used in [6]. The results below for the effect of lo-
cal measurement on the adjacency matrix were previ-
ously derived [14] in the context of local complementa-
tion [8, 28], although here we also explicitly derive the
effect of local measurement on the graph labels. We find
the following:
Proposition 1. Given an encoded graph state |Gℓ〉, sup-
pose a measurement of (XmZ)i yields the value ω
s. Then
the resultant labelled graph state is obtained by the fol-
lowing procedure:
(M1) For each pair j, k of distinct neighbours of i, change
Ajk 7→ Ajk +mAijAik.
(M2) Relabel each vertex j by zj 7→ zj+Aijs+mAijzi+
mAij(Aij + 1)/2 and mj 7→ mA2ij .
(M3) Remove vertex i and corresponding edges.
Proof. We first introduce the operators U and R, defined
as
U |k〉 :=
∑
j∈Fd
ωjk|j〉 (14)
R := U−1S−1U. (15)
It follows that UXU−1 = Z, and UZU−1 = X−1. We
also have [R,X ] = [S,Z] = 0, and RZR−1 = SXS−1 =
XZ; i.e. the R operator performs a Z ↔ XZ basis
transformation just as S performs X ↔ XZ.
4For each local Pauli operator O = XnZm, we define
the operator PO,j , which is the projection onto the ω
j-
eigenspace of O:
PO,j :=
1
d
∑
k∈Fd
ω−jkOk. (16)
We first consider the case m = 0 where the projective
measurement is of Zi. We have
|Gℓ〉 =
∏
vj∈V
C
Aij
ij |0¯〉i|Gℓ \ vi〉V\vi . (17)
where |Gℓ \ vi〉 denotes the graph state with vertex vi
and all its edges removed, and V \ vi denotes the set all
of players excluding player i. Next, noting that
∏
vj∈V
C
Aij
ij =
∏
vj∈V
∑
k∈Fd
(PZ,k)iZ
kAij
j =
∑
k∈Fd
(PZ,k)iZ
kAi ,
(18)
we have
(PZ,s)i|Gℓ〉 = (PZ,s)i
∏
vj∈V
C
Aij
ij |0¯〉i|Gℓ \ vi〉V\vi
= (PZ,s)i
(∑
k∈Fd
(PZ,k)iZ
kAi
)
|0¯〉i|Gℓ \ vi〉V\vi
=
1√
d
|s〉iZsAi |Gℓ \ vi〉V\vi . (19)
Now we consider the case m 6= 0. Let
Li := R
−1
i S
−A2i . (20)
where we define
OkA
2
i :=
∏
vj∈V
O
kA2ij
j . (21)
Then, for each vj ∈ V,
Lmi KjL
−m
i = R
−m
i S
−mA2iXjZ
AjSmA
2
iRmi
= ωmAij(Aij+1)/2K
−mAij
i K
′
j , (22)
where K ′j = XjZ
Aj+mAij(Ai)Z
−mA2ij
j . Equation (22) fol-
lows from the relation
(X−1Z)Aij = ωAij(Aij−1)/2X−AijZAij . (23)
Thus, noting that Ki commutes with Li, we have
K ′j = ω
−mAij(Aij+1)/2Lmi K
mAij
i KjL
−m
i , (24)
so
K ′jL
m
i |Gℓ〉 = ω−mAij(Aij+1)/2Lmi KmAiji Kj |Gℓ〉
= ω−mAij(Aij+1)/2−mAijzi−zjLmi |Gℓ〉. (25)
The state Lmi |Gℓ〉, which we will denote |τmi (Gℓ)〉, is
therefore an encoded graph state |τmi (Gℓ)〉, stabilized by
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FIG. 2. Effect of a local XZ2 measurement (with result ω2)
on vertex 1 of an encoded-square qudit graph with weight-2
edges in d = 5. Labels are denoted (z, x,m). Following the
measurement, vertex 1 and all its edges are removed. Vertices
2 and 3 gain an edge of weight N23 = 0+6 = 1 (modulo d = 5)
and vertex labels z = 1 + 4 + 4 + 6 = 0, m = 8 = 3.
the K ′j operators. The structure (i.e. the adjacency ma-
trix) of the graph τma (Gℓ) is given by equating the A
′
j
for each vertex to the Ai given in the standard form for
graph-state stabilizers in (11), and we similarly find the
labels
z′j = zj +mAijzi +mAij(Aij + 1)/2. (26)
We also have
L−mi (PZ,s)iL
m
i =
1
d
∑
k∈Fd
ω−skRmi S
mA2iZki S
−mA2iR−mi
=
1
d
∑
k∈Fd
ω−sk(XmZ)ki
= (PXmZ,s)i. (27)
Thus we compute
(PXmZ,s)i|Gℓ〉
= L−mi (PZ,s)iL
m
i |Gℓ〉
=
1√
d
(Rm|s〉)i(SmA
2
iZsAi |τmi (Gℓ) \ vi〉)V\vi . (28)
Hence a local measurement ofXZm on the vertex vi gives
the graph |τmi (Gℓ)〉 with the vi vertex removed and ad-
ditional labelling operators SmA
2
iZsAi applied.
The reduced-state graph transformation given in M1
can be regarded as an analogue of local complementation
for qubit graphs; note however that we have not shown
(as is true for the qubit case) that all graphs equivalent
under local Clifford group operations are similarly equiv-
alent under such transformations. This has been proven
elsewhere [14].
An example of the effect of local measurement is given
in Fig. 2 for a 4-party square state with d = 5, all edges
of weight 2 and each vertex having the labels (z, x,m) =
(1, 0, 1). If player 1 performs a measurement of XZ2 and
gets a result of ω2, the state is transformed as shown.
5E. Dependence and access
We now consider conditions such that a subset of play-
ers can independently recover a secret encoded into the
labels of a labelled qudit graph state, using the terminol-
ogy previously employed for the qubit case [6]. For a state
|Gℓ〉〈Gℓ|, consider a subset of players V′ ⊆ V. Without
any assistance from any other players the subset V′ only
has access to the reduced state ρV′ = TrV\V′ |Gℓ〉〈Gℓ| and
must recover the secret from this state.
Considering then some secret s ∈ Fd, which is a func-
tion of the labels ℓ, it follows that the set of players V′
are clearly unable to recover s if the state ρV′ is invariant
under changes in k. If this is not the case, we say the
reduced state is dependent on the value s.
However, dependency is generally insufficient for the
players to be able to recover s. We say that a set of
players V′ can access s if there is a measurement protocol
the players in V′ can perform on ρV′ such that the value
of s is revealed to them with certainty.
We find the following:
Proposition 2. Given an encoded graph state, if for a
set of vertices V′ ⊆ V, we have some corresponding set
of values {wi} ∈ Fd (with wi = 0 for all vi /∈ V′) then∑
iwizi is accessible to the parties in V
′ via LOCC if∑
vj∈V
wiAij = 0 for all vi ∈ V \ V′.
Proof. Each party vi ∈ V′ measures Kwii for an overall
stabilizer K =
∏
vi∈V′
Kwii . The graph state is thus an
eigenstate of K with eigenvalue ω−
∑
i wizi ; thus the par-
ties in V′ can jointly retrieve
∑
iwizi.
Corollary 3. In an encoded graph state, the label zk is
accessible via LOCC by V′ if V′ contains vk and all of its
neighbours.
Proof. Apply Proposition 2 with wk = 1 and all wi6=k =
0, so that
∑
iwizi = zk. For any vj ∈ V \ V′, we have
that
∑
eij∈e
wiAij = Akj = 0 since vj is outside V
′ and
thus not a neighbour of vi. The stabilizer K in the proof
of Proposition 2 is just Ki in this case; hence measuring
Ki gives the value zi.
Note that, because labels are applied to a given ver-
tex via local Pauli operations on that vertex, the reduced
graph state obtainable by tracing out a given vertex (i.e.
a given player) must be independent of that vertex’s la-
bels. Hence those labels are inaccessible to the remaining
players. We exploit this property to determine the min-
imum number of players required to recover a secret in
threshold secret sharing protocols.
1. Label “shuffling”
As for the qubit case, we demonstrate that a given sub-
set of parties is independent of a particular qudit label by
“shuffling” the label onto qudits not in the subset. That
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Shuffle 1→ 2
d = 5
FIG. 3. Effect of label shuffling from vertex 1 to 2 on an
encoded square qudit graph with weight-2 edges in d = 5.
Labels are denoted (z, x,m). Vertex 1’s z label is set to 0.
Vertex 2’s x label is set to −3/2 = 1 (mod d = 5), and vertex
3’s z label is set to −6/2 = 2.
is, we demonstrate that the transfer of the label onto
a different qudit (such that the original qudit no longer
has any dependence on the label) results in a physically
equivalent state. Thus the label shuffling procedure does
not represent any physical operation or change in the
state: it merely generates an equally valid relabelling of
the same physical state.
Proposition 4. Let |Gℓ〉 be an encoded graph state,
and let players i and j be neighbours. Then |Gℓ〉 is
equivalent to the labelled graph state |Gℓ′〉 where vertex
i is relabelled z′i = 0, vertex j is relabelled (z
′
j , x
′
j) =
(zj ,−A−1ij zi), and each neighbour k of j is relabelled
z′k = zk −A−1ij Ajkzi).
Proof. Noting that Kj stabilizes |Gℓ〉, it follows that
K
−A−1
ij
zi
j |Gℓ〉 ∝ |Gℓ′〉, which, from (11), corresponds to
the above relabelling.
We demonstrate the above concept in Fig. 3 using a
4-qudit square graph with weight-2 edges in d = 5, with
a label of z = 3 on vertex 1 and all other labels equal to
zero, and shuffling player 1’s label to player 2.
III. SECRET SHARING PROTOCOLS
A. CC scheme
In a (k, n) CC threshold scheme, the players’ shared
quantum state is privately transferred to them by the
dealer, after which a classical secret can be reconstructed
by any k of n players (but no fewer) using classical chan-
nels between the players. We demonstrate the feasibility
of such schemes using labelled graph states by encoding
a secret “dit” s on to the z labels of certain vertices of
the graph. We then show that a subset of m parties may
measure s by jointly measuring one of the graph state’s
stabilizers Ki. Finally, to demonstrate that fewer than
m parties cannot obtain s, it is sufficient to show that
we can shuffle the vertices’ z values such that any given
611 1 1
2 n n3
1
−1
z1 = s→ 0
x3 = 0→−s
FIG. 4. Shuffling of a classical secret s from player 1 to player
3 in a CC protocol for an encoded tree state. As this label
can be shuffled to any player (or remain with player 1), any
subset of the parties has no dependence on s.
set of fewer than k parties has no dependence on s (for
which it is clearly sufficient to demonstrate the above for
k − 1 parties only).
Note that secret sharing is known to be information-
theoretically secure in the classical case; in our analysis
we are showing that such protocols may be unified within
the graph state formalism. CC protocols within our for-
malism also provide a useful basis for the CQ and QQ
cases, as shown later.
We find that such schemes may be implemented for
d-dimensional analogues of all the qubit states for which
it was previously demonstrated [6], using essentially the
same reasoning.
1. (n,n) CC protocol in the tree state
We can implement an (n, n) protocol using a tree state,
consisting of a single vertex connected by weight-1 edges
to n − 1 additional vertices, as illustrated in Fig. 4. (In
the 3-party qubit case with all labels set to zero this is the
well-known Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger-Mermin state).
We set z1 = s and zi = 0 for all i 6= 1. For this state,
the stabilizer K1 = (XZ
m1)1 ⊗ Z2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zn has the
eigenvalue ω−s, and the value of s may thus be accessed
through local measurements by all n parties.
We see that s is inaccessible to any smaller number
of parties as follows: The set of n − 1 parties excluding
player 1 has no dependence on s. However, we can also
shuffle the s dependence from player 1 to any other party
i as described in Proposition 4. This leaves us with z1 =
0, xi = −z1 = −s, and all other labels unchanged, in
which case the labels for all players other than i have no
dependence on s. Hence all n players are necessary to
recover s.
2. (2,3) CC protocol
We can implement a (2, 3) protocol using the labelled
graph state in Fig. 5. We encode the classical secret
11
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(s,0,0)(2s,0,0)
FIG. 5. Encoding of a classical secret s ∈ Fd onto a three-
party state to enable a (2, 3) CC protocol. It can be seen that
the secret can be shuffled away from any single qubit. At the
same time any two players can access the secret as explained
in the text.
s ∈ Fd by setting z1 = 0, z2 = 2s and z3 = s and set all
other labels to zero as illustrated.
To see that no single player can access the secret we
apply the shuffling as described in Proposition 3. Player
1 cannot access the secret, as he has no label-dependence
on the secret. The label z2 = 2s can be removed by
shuffling it to player 1 and player 3 as per Proposition
3 (explicitly by multiplication of stabilizer K−2s1 ); hence
player 2 cannot access the secret. The label z3 = s can
be removed by shuffling it to player 1 and player 3 as per
Proposition 3 (explicitly by multiplication of stabilizer
K−s1 ), hence player 3 also cannot access the secret.
To see that any pair can access the secret, we take each
pair separately. Players 1 and 2 can measureK2 = Z1X2,
giving outcome ω−2s. Players 1 and 3 can measure K3 =
Z1X3, giving outcome ω
−s. Players 2 and 3 can measure
Kd−12 K3 = X
d−1
2 X3, giving outcome ω
s.
3. (3,4) CC protocol in the ring state
We can implement a (3, 4) protocol using a square en-
coded graph state with weight-1 edges and mi = 0 for all
i, by setting zi = s for all i.
Thus we have Ki = ω
−s for all i and e.g. K2 =
Z1X2Z3, so players 1, 2 and 3 can collaborate to measure
s. By the symmetry of the state, this is similarly the case
for any set of three players.
As depicted in Fig. 6, we can shuffle the s dependence
of player 1 to player 2. This sets z1 = 0, x2 = −s and
z3 = s − s = 0. This leaves the labels of 1 and 3 inde-
pendent of s; hence neither they, nor (by symmetry) any
two nonadjacent parties, can obtain s.
If they subsequently perform a 4 → 3 shuffle, this
leaves player 1’s labels unaltered and sets player 4’s z
label to 0; hence 1 and 4 (and thus any two adjacent
players) cannot obtain Z, thereby completing the proof.
4. (3,5) CC protocol in the ring state
We can implement a (3, 5) protocol using a 5-vertex
ring-shaped encoded graph state with weight-1 edges, as
71 1
1
1
1 1
1
1
b)a)
2
3
2
3
1 1
4 4
x2→−sz1→ 0
z3→ 0 z4→ 0
z1 = 0
x3→−s
(x2 =−s)
z2→ 0
FIG. 6. CC protocol in an encoded (3, 4) ring state. All
players start with z = s. Dependence on the label s can be
shuffled such that any two a) nonadjacent or b) adjacent par-
ties are independent of the label. Note that the the shuffling
in b) occurs after first performing that in a)
3
1
5
4
2
1
1
z5→−s
x4→−s z3→ 0
1
1
1
z2→ 0
x1→−s
FIG. 7. CC protocol for an encoded (3, 5) ring state. All
players start with z = s. Dependence on the label s can be
shuffled such that any two adjacent parties are independent
of s (see Fig. 8 for nonadjacent parties.
shown in Figs. 7 and 8, setting mi = 0 for all i and zi = s
for all i, so again a Ki measurement yields ω
−s for all i
and, for example, K2 = Z1X2Z3 so players 1, 2 and 3
(hence any three adjacent parties) can measure s.
The other possibility is where only two of three players
are adjacent, e.g. 1, 2 and 4. For the ring state we have
Ki = XiZi+1Zi−1 (29)
so
K1K2K
−1
4 = X1Z2X2Z4X
−1
4 , (30)
which can be measured by players 1, 2 and 4, giving ω−s.
Hence any 3 parties can recover s.
In the 5-qudit ring state we can always renumber the
parties such that for two parties i and j, i+1 ≤ j ≤ i+2.
In this case i and j can shuffle their s dependence to the
parties i−1 and j+1; hence two players are not sufficient
to recover s.
B. The CQ scheme
As in [6], we implement CQ schemes by performing a
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, wherein the
3
1
5
4
2
1
1
z4→ 0
1
1
1
z2→ 0
x1→−s
(z5,x5)→ (0,−s)
FIG. 8. Shuffling of the label s such that any two nonadjacent
parties are independent of s, for the (3, 5) ring state.
dealer and a subset of the players end up securely shar-
ing a random secret dit s. This shared random classical
information can then be used by these parties to securely
share any specified secret of the same length via standard
classical cryptography protocols.
We implement such QKD protocols in graph states by
having the dealer distribute the players’ qudits to them
over public channels, after which the dealer and the play-
ers measure their own qudits using bases chosen at ran-
dom. After measurement the dealer and players publi-
cally announce their bases and only retain their measure-
ment results for certain combinations of chosen bases,
such that m of the players may collaborate to obtain a
classical secret shared with the dealer.
The CQ protocols we have found follow a pattern
whereby the result of the dealer’s measurement is a pro-
jection of the resultant reduced graph into a labelled state
whose labels are correlated with the dealer’s measure-
ment, and for which the players can perform a CC pro-
tocol.
As in [6], our protocol is based on that of Hillery, Buzˇek
and Berthiaume [3] and has the same limitation of being
secure against certain classes of attack such as intercept-
resend attacks by an eavesdropper or certain classes of
attack by dishonest participants [3], but not against all
attacks by dishonest participants [29]. Additionally, we
do not consider the case of noisy channels, although exist-
ing protocols which do [30] could potentially be adapted
to our model.
1. (n, n) CQ protocol in the extended tree state
We can construct an (n, n) CQ protocol using an “ex-
tended” tree state, consisting of an n-party tree state (as
in the CC protocol) with the dealer’s qudit connected to
player 1’s qudit by a weight-1 edge and all labels set to
0, as illustrated in Fig. 9. This graph state therefore has
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1
1
−n 1
1
2 3 n
D
FIG. 9. The “extended” tree state used for the CQ protocol.
Local measurement on the dealer’s qudit produces a reduced
state of the form of that in Fig. 4 (although with an additional
m = tD label on vertex 1.)
stabilizers
KD = XDZ1 (31)
K1 = ZDX1
∏
i6=1
Zi (32)
Ki = XiZ1 (i 6= 1). (33)
In our protocol, the dealer and the players 1, . . . , n each
independently randomly choose a value tD, t1, . . . tn ∈ Fd.
The dealer then measures her qudit in the basis XtDZ,
player 1 measures XZt1 whereas the remaining players i
each measure XtiZ.
If the dealer’s measurement result is ωs then, from
Proposition 1, the reduced state of the remaining n par-
ties is the nGHZM state (without the additional dealer’s
vertex), still with weight-1 edges. The only relabelled
vertex is that of player 1, with z1 = s, m1 = tD. All
other labels remain zero. The reduced graph therefore
has stabilizers
k1 = (XZ
tD)1Z2 · · ·Zn (34)
ki = Z1Xi, i 6= 1 (35)
(here and henceforth we use ki to denote reduced-state
stabilizers and Ki for the full state including the dealer).
Furthermore, the labelling is such that the reduced state
has eigenvalue 1 for all the stabilizers with i 6= 1. Thus
any product of stabilizers k1k
l2
2 · · · klnn will have eigen-
value ω−s. As
(XZt1)1
∏
i6=1
(XtiZ)i = k1k
t2
2 · · · ktnn Z
(tD−t1+
∑
i6=1)
1 (36)
the players measure such a product (and hence are able
to recover s) if t1 = tD + t2+ · · ·+ tn, which occurs with
probability 1/d.
Security against an eavesdropper having tampered
with the qudits (e.g. an intercept-resend attack) is es-
tablished by noting that the combination of the player
11
2 1
b)a)
11
32
1
2
1
D
3
(s+ tD,0, tD)
2tD
(2s+3tD,0,4tD)
FIG. 10. a) The “extended” (2, 3) state used for the CQ
protocol. Local measurement on the dealer’s qudit produces
a reduced state of the type in b)
and dealer’s measurements satisfies
(XtDZ)D(XZ
t
1)1
∏
i6=1
(XtiZ)i = K
tD
D K1K
t2
2 · · ·Ktnn ;
(37)
i.e. the players and dealer can also combine their mea-
surement statistics for the various values of ti to measure
the stabilizers of, and hence verify, the original state.
2. (2, 3) CQ protocol
We can construct a (2, 3) CQ protocol through extend-
ing the CC case by attaching the dealer’s qudit to those of
players 2 and 3 with weights of two and one respectively
and setting all labels to zero, as illustrated in Fig. 10.
The stabilizers for this state are
KD = XDZ
2
2Z3, (38)
K1 = X1Z2Z3, (39)
K2 = Z
2
DZ1X2, (40)
K3 = ZDZ
2
1X3. (41)
The dealer randomly selects a variable tD ∈ Fd and mea-
sures XtDZ, and obtains result ωs. The resultant graph
states are given by Proposition 5, as shown in Fig. 10 b),
with stabilizers
k1,tD = X1Z2Z3, (42)
k2,tD = Z1X2Z
4tD
2 Z
2tD
3 , (43)
k3,tD = Z1Z
2tD
2 X3Z
tD
3 . (44)
We now need to see how sets of players can or cannot
access the random value s of the dealer’s measurement
result. First, for any choice of tD, no single player can
access s by application of Proposition 3 to Fig. 10 b). To
see how any pair can access the dealer’s result, we must
address each measurement parameter tD and resultant
graph separately and see which measurement the players
would ideally make. In the protocol, any given authorised
set of players then choose randomly one of these possible
measurements, which sometimes match that of the dealer
9and enable this set of players to access the secret and
in addition provide security by effectively measuring a
stabilizer of the total state Fig. 10 a).
We now go through how each pair can access s if the
dealer measures as above. Players 1 and 2 can access the
dealer’s result by measuring
k−2tD1,tD k2,tD ,
allowing them to obtain ω−(2s+3tD). Players 1 and 3
would measure
k−2tD1,tD k3,tD ,
allowing them to obtain ω−(s+tD). Players 2 and 3 would
measure
k2,tDk
−1
3,tD
,
allowing them to obtain ω−(s+2tD).
In this protocol, each authorised set will measure ran-
domly from one of the three possible measurements cor-
responding to tD. For example, if players 1 and 2 decide
to work together to obtain the secret, they will randomly
measure
k
−2t′D
1,t′
D
k2,t′
D
by choosing their random variable t′D (agreed between
players 1 and 2). By definition of the stabilizers these do
not commute, hence cannot be measured simultaneously.
Their measurements will coincide with the dealer’s when
t′D = tD, which happens with probability 1/d. After an-
nouncing the bases they can then throw away all results
that do not coincide.
Security can be proven by noting that including the
dealer’s measurement results allows the dealer plus an
authorised set to simulate measurement of stabilizers of
the original graph Fig. 10 a). An additional subtlety of
simulating measurements locally in the qudit case, as ap-
posed to the qubit case, is that there is more than one
possible commuting Pauli. Any local extended Pauli on
a qudit i, Oi, commutes with all powers of this Pauli op-
erator Omi , which means they share common eigenbases.
Further, as there are no degeneracies, the eigenvalues are
just a re-ordering. Thus, if measuring Oi yields result
ωs, we know that, even without doing any further mea-
surement, Omi would give result ω
ms. In this way, we can
simulate any power of a Pauli Omi just by measuring Oi.
In the protocol, some of the sifted key would be sac-
rificed now to check the security by announcing some
randomly chosen results. If we again look at players 1
and 2 for example, by combining their results with those
of the dealer, they can simulate measuring stabilizers Ki
of the original state (Fig. 10a), equation (42 - 44), since
K2tDD K
−2tD
1 K2 = ω
3tD (XtDD ZD)
2k−2tD1,tD k2,tD . (45)
If there has been no interference from an eavesdropper,
they will all measure outcome 1 for, with high probability
1
3
5
4
2
D
1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
FIG. 11. The “extended” (3, 5) state used for the CQ pro-
tocol. Local measurement on the dealer’s qudit produces a
reduced state of the type in Fig. 12.
given a large number of announced results, every value
of tD. Although this outcome is not enough to guaran-
tee that the state before measurement was the state of
Fig. 10 a), it restricts the allowed space to that which
guarantees security as follows: if g is the subgraph got
by removing player 3 and all its edges from Fig. 10 a),
having eigenvalue 1 for all these stabilizers implies that
the state of the dealer plus players 1 and 2 is in the sub-
space spanned by {gz=(i,i,0)} i.e. where players 1 and 2
have z1 = z2 and players 3 has z3 = 0. Thus, the most
general state including an eavesdropper E can be written
∑
i
αi|i〉E |gz=(i,i,0)〉D,1,2, (46)
It can then be checked that the reduced density matrix
of the dealer and the eavesdropper is
ρED = ρE ⊗ 1D/d, (47)
which implies that the eavesdropper cannot share any
information about the dealer’s results. It can similarly
be checked for pairs of players 2 and 3, and 1 and 3.
3. (3,5) CQ protocol
We can construct a (3, 5) CQ protocol by extending
the CC case by attaching the dealer’s qudit to each player
with weight one edges, and all labels set to zero, as illus-
trated in Fig. 11. The stabilizers for this state are
KD = XDZ1Z2Z3Z4Z5 (48)
K1 = ZDX1Z2Z5 (49)
K2 = ZDZ1X2Z3 (50)
K3 = ZDZ2X3Z4 (51)
K4 = ZDZ3X4Z5 (52)
K5 = ZDZ1Z4X5 (53)
The dealer randomly selects a variable tD ∈ Fd and
measures XtDZ, and obtains result ωs. The resultant
graph states are shown in Fig. 12. The associated stabi-
lizers of player i are denoted ki,tD .
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1
3
5
4
2
(s+ tD,0, tD)
1+ tD
tD
tD tD
tDtD
1+ tD
(s+ tD,0, tD)
(s+ tD,0, tD)
1+ tD
1+ tD
1+ tD
(s+ tD,0, tD)
(s+ tD,0, tD)
FIG. 12. Resultant state from the dealer’s local measurement
on Fig. 11.
First we check that each pair of players cannot access s
without collaborating with the others. From Proposition
3, players 1 and 2 cannot access the dealer’s result (the
secret) as explicitly by application of the stabilizers
k
−(1+st−1
D
)
4,tD
(shuffling from player 1 to 4) if tD 6= 0 or
k−s3,tDk
−s
5,tD
(shuffling from 1 to 5 and 2 to 3) if tD = 0. We can see
that players 1 and 3 cannot access s since the dependence
can be removed by application of
k
−(s+tD)(1+tD)
−1
2,tD
(shuffling from 1 to 2) if tD + 1 6= 0 or
k
−(1+st−1
D
)
4,tD
k
−(1+st−1
D
)
5,tD
(shuffling from 3 to 4 and 1 to 5) if tD + 1 = 0. By
symmetry no pair alone can access s.
We now see how any three players can access the secret
for a given tD. Players 1, 2 and 3 can do so by measuring
k−tD1,tDk
1+2tD
2,tD
k−tD3 ,
yielding result ω−(s+tD). Players 1, 3 and 4 can do so by
measuring
k
−(1+2tD)
1,tD
k1+tD3,tD k
1+tD
4,tD
,
yielding result ω−(s+tD). By symmetry any three players
can therefore find s.
In this protocol, any set of authorised players measures
randomly in accordance with these procedures. For ex-
ample Players 1,2 and 3 will randomly measure stabilizers
k
−t′D
1,t′
D
k
1+2t′D
2,t′
D
k
−t′D
3 ,
by choosing a shared random variable t′D. Security is
then checked by verifying that the eigenequations are
satisfied by the dealer and the player, by communicating
results to simulate measurement of a subset of stabilizers.
For example, the dealer plus players 1, 2 and 3 can, by
comparing results, calculate what would have been the
measured value for the stabilizers (of the original graph
Fig. 11, equation (48-53)), because
K
t′D
D K
−t′D
1 K
1+2t′D
2 K
−t′D
3 (54)
= ωt
′
DX
t′D
D ZDk
−t′D
1,t′
D
k
1+2t′D
2,t′
D
k
−t′D
3 . (55)
If the eigenvalue is 1 for all of these (as should be the
case; if not the protocol restarts), this implies the joint
state of the dealer plus players 1, 2 and 3 is in the sub-
space spanned by {|gz=(i+j,i,0,j)〉D,1,2,3}. As for the (2, 3)
case, this implies that, for the most general state of an
eavesdropper E and dealer, their reduced density matrix
is of the form
ρE,D = ρE ⊗ 1D/d; (56)
hence the eavesdropper’s state is completely uncorrelated
with the dealer’s measurement result and therefore un-
correlated with the secret. Security can similarly be
checked for all sets of three or more players.
C. The QQ scheme
The QQ scheme proposed in [6] is readily generalisable
to qudits. This protocol is similar to the CQ scheme,
but the secret to be shared is now a quantum state |s〉
in a d-dimensional Hilbert space, initially possessed by
the dealer, who distributes it to the other parties via a
joint operation on the secret state and the parties’ shared
graph state, in a manner analogous to quantum telepor-
tation. We describe the general protocol explicitly below.
Denoting the dealer’s secret qudit as
|s〉D =
d−1∑
i=0
αi|i〉D, (57)
the dealer prepares the state
|s〉D|G〉D,V (58)
corresponding to some graph state G for the dealer’s qu-
ditD and all the players’ qudits V . The dealer distributes
the players’ qudits to them (over perfect quantum chan-
nels, which we can assume to be public). The dealer then
measures her two qudits in the generalized Bell basis [31]
{|ψmn〉}, where
|ψmn〉 := 1√
d
∑
j
ωjn|j〉|j +m〉. (59)
If the dealer’s measurement result is (m,n), corre-
sponding to the state |ψmn〉, then it follows from our
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rules for projective measurement that the resultant state
for all parties is
|ψmn〉D〈ψmn||s〉D|G〉D,V
∝ |ψmn〉D
∑
j
αjω
−jn|gz=(j+m)(AD1,AD2...,ADN )〉V
(60)
where |gz〉 is the encoded reduced graph state on the
players 1, . . . , n with labels z.
If the dealer informs the players of their measurement
result (m,n), then a set of players ∈ V (including some
player a with NDa 6= 0) can apply a correction operator
Umn := K
−nN−1
Da
a Z
−mAD (61)
to obtain the state
|sg〉V =
∑
j
αj |gz=j(AD1,...ADN )〉V . (62)
The access properties of this final state depend on the
graph state used. Qualitatively, for certain initial graph
states, the state |sg〉V can be regarded as a superposition
(with coefficients corresponding to those of the encoded
secret) of orthogonal labelled graph states whose labels
have the same access structure as CC protocols. Thus,
the ability to recover the quantum secret corresponds to
the ability to recover these classical labels, providing a
natural extension of the classical protocols to the quan-
tum case.
However, the above reasoning does not guarantee that
such a QQ protocol will have the same adversary struc-
ture as the corresponding CC protocol, as seen below,
where we achieve “perfect” threshold schemes in the
(2, 3) and (5, 3) cases, but fewer than n players can still
obtain some secret information in the (n, n) case.
1. (n, n) QQ protocol using the nGHZM state
If the joint graph state of the dealer and players |G〉
is the same as for the CQ scheme (i.e. an nGHZM state
with an additional dealer’s vertex, connected to player 1,
and all labels set to zero), then the final players’ state is
|sg〉V =
∑
j
αj |gz=(j,0,...,0)〉V (63)
where V is the set of all players. The |g〉 states, in the
form of nGHZM states with a label on player 1’s vertex,
are the same as those used in the (n, n) CC protocol, to
which the access properties described in Sec. III A 1 ap-
ply, and fewer than n players cannot perfectly reconstruct
the secret.
However, we note that the reduced states of fewer than
n players are not independent of the αj . For example,
in the analogous qubit protocol [6] we can, in some basis
(depending on the player), express the reduced state of
a single player as diag(|α0 + α1|2, |α0 − α1|2). Thus this
(n, n) protocol is not a “perfect” threshold scheme; it
allows some incomplete information to be accessed by
fewer than n players.
However the secret qudit is clearly encoded within the
state of the n players and so may be accessed by all play-
ers by performing joint quantum operations. Further-
more, the secret can be isolated to any individual player
through LOCC,as follows.
For any player i other than player 1, the secret can
be isolated by player 1 measuring X and the rest of the
players other than i measuring Z, which is evident by
rewriting the state as
|sg〉V =
∑
j
|gz=(j,0,...,0)〉V\vi
(∑
k
αk|j − k〉i
)
. (64)
The secret can be isolated to player 1 by every player
other than 1 measuring Z, thereby producing the state
|s′g〉V =
∑
k2
· · ·
∑
kn
∑
j
αj
× |−(j + k2 + · · ·+ kn)〉1|k2〉2 · · · |kn〉n. (65)
Thus the quantum secret requires collaboration by all
n players (and no fewer) to recover but the players may
collaboratively make the secret locally accessible to a sin-
gle player if they so wish.
2. (2,3) QQ protocol
We can construct a (2, 3) QQ protocol by teleporting
the secret qudit (57) into the extended graph state of
Fig. 10. The encoded state is
|sg〉V =
d−1∑
j=0
αj |gz=j(0,2,1)〉 (66)
for g the (unlabelled) graph in Fig. 5. The state (66) can
be rewritten as
|sg〉V = 1√
d
d−1∑
j,k=0
αj |k〉1|2j + k〉2|j + k〉3
=
1√
d
d−1∑
j,M=0
αj |M − j〉1|M + j〉2|M〉3 (67)
where M = j + k.
For d = 3 this state corresponds exactly to the (2, 3)
qutrit code presented in [4]. Any pair of players can
thus access the secret, and any single player cannot. For
example, players 1 and 2 perform control operations that
add the value of the first register (without an overbar) to
the second register (with an overbar), and then − 12 times
the value of the second to the first (again, keeping the
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first register non-barred and the second always barred).
This leaves the resultant state as
1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
αj |−j〉1
d−1∑
M=0
|2M〉2|M〉3. (68)
Any pair can similarly obtain the secret. Since single
players form complementary sets to pairs of players, it
follows from information gain implying disturbance [4]
(and can be shown explicitly) that no single player can
obtain any information about the secret, so this is a per-
fect threshold scheme.
3. (3, 5) QQ protocol
We can construct a (3, 5) QQ protocol by teleporting
the secret qudit into the extended graph state of Fig. 11.
The encoded state is then
|sg〉V =
d−1∑
j=0
αj |gz=(j,j,...j)〉 (69)
where g is the (unlabelled) graph of Fig. 7. The state
can be rewritten as
|sg〉V = 1
d
d−1∑
x,y=0
|x〉1|y〉2
×


d−1∑
j=0
αjω
j(x+y)+xy|hz=(j+x,j,j+y)〉3,4,5


(70)
where h is the subgraph corresponding to players 3, 4 and
5 taken by removing all other vertices and their edges.
The fact that each vector z occurs only once means that
players 3, 4 and 5 can always measure in such a way to
project them only onto the a subspace corresponding to
some |xy〉1,2. Each would occur with equal probability
of 1/d2.
If for example their measurements put them onto the
|hz=(j,j,j)〉3,4,5 subspace (corresponding to x = y = 0),
they know from the above that they would obtain the
state
d−1∑
j=0
αj |hz=(j,j,j)〉3,4,5, (71)
hence would have the secret encoded into the graph state
|h〉. Suitable global operations could then be used to map
the state onto any subsystem they liked. For example
performing (Cab)
−1 between players 3 and 4, as well as
between players 4 and 5, gives the state
d−1∑
j=0
αj |j¯〉3|j¯〉4|j¯〉5. (72)
Players 3 and 4 can measure in their respective Z bases,
to shuffle the information to player 5. Similarly it can be
shuffled to any player.
To see how players 2, 4 and 5 can access the secret
qutrit, we rewrite the state as
|sg〉V = 1
d
d−1∑
x,y=0
|x〉1|y〉2
×


d−1∑
j=0
αjω
j(x+y)|hz=(j+x+y,j+x,j+y)〉2,4,5


(73)
where h is the subgraph of players 2, 4 and 5 found by
removing all other vertices and their edges. Each possi-
ble vector z occurs only once in this expansion. By the
same tactics players 2,4 and 5 can access the secret. By
symmetry, any three can access the secret. As with the
(2, 3) case, perfect secret recovery by 3 players requires
that the complementary sets of 2 players cannot obtain
any information about the secret (as can also be shown
explicitly), so this is a perfect threshold scheme.
We note that the existence of a (3, 5) QQ protocol
in graph states of arbitrary dimension has been implied
by the work of Gheorghiu, Looi and Griffiths [32], who
showed that encoded information can be isolated to 3 of
the 5 qudits in a graph state.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have developed a unified framework for the three
types of secret sharing in prime-dimensional Hilbert
space. Our formalism uses prime-dimensional graph
states, analogous to those in the qubit case, and our
protocols allow sharing of classical “dits” and prime-
dimensional quantum states as secrets. Our protocols in-
clude the case of (2, 3) sharing, which was not achievable
in the qubit formalism in addition to higher-dimensional
analogues of qubit protocols. Our work provides a use-
ful step towards describing schemes sharing classical and
quantum secrets of any size within a graph-state formal-
ism for general physical systems.
Our work suggests several areas for further research.
Still open are the questions of whether any achiev-
able threshold secret sharing scheme can be constructed
within our formalism, and, if so, what the associ-
ated graph states and protocols would be. If prime-
dimensional systems are not sufficient to construct any
scheme, it is possible that an analogous formalism in-
volving states of any dimension might allow for a richer
array of protocols, as we have shown occurs when moving
beyond the qubit case. Generalising to the case of arbi-
trary d is thus another promising area for further work,
and some of the methods described in [32] (which con-
siders such general graph states) may be useful here.
With regard to achieving arbitrary threshold schemes,
we additionally note that the graph state formalism can
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in principle be used for sharing of quantum secrets for
arbitrary access structures. This property of the formal-
ism stems from the fact that schemes exist for arbitrary
access structures using high-dimensional stabilizer states
[4, 5], and that it can be shown that all stabilizer states
are locally equivalent to qudit graph states [14, 33]. How-
ever there is no explicit procedure for converting these
schemes to graphs, and further, it is not immediately
clear that they can also be used for sharing classical se-
crets (though it seems very likely). Developing such a
procedure would provide a graph state formalism for ar-
bitrary access structures in quantum secret sharing, al-
though it may not be equivalent to that in our current
work.
There are also several possible extensions to the anal-
ysis of CQ protocols within our formalism: considering
more general attacks involving dishonest participants,
the presence of channel noise, and the overall efficiency
of the protocol; i.e. the need to discard states when the
participants’ bases do not match. It is an open question
which graph states would produce the highest key rates
(and hence secret-sharing rates) per state within our for-
malism.
Further generalisation may allow a wide range
of secret-sharing schemes to be described in this
intuitively-appealing way.
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